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Slashing moderator
In Phase 0, a validator can be slashed (a more severe penalty) if they violate the Casper FFG rules or if they create two beacon blocks in one epoch. Slashings lead to the permanent exit of perpetrators from the Beacon Chain. Until the ETH becomes withdrawable this means that slashed validators incur a significant opportunity cost as their ETH remains locked, yet unproductive.

Ad hoc penalty

Given slashing is the most severe penalty in PoS Ethereum and frequently caused by operators running improper or overly risky set-ups, we have considered implementing an ad hoc penalty on the total effectiveness score of a given validator index.
  • Slashing penalty: -30% such that if their score up to that point was 95%, it would immediately get reduced to 65%.
NOTE: We have NOT implemented the slashing moderator in our methodology for the rated_v0 effectiveness calculation.

Opportunity cost penalties

Granted the significant opportunity cost incurred for validators that are slashed and exited prior to withdrawals being enabled, we also think that it would make sense to effect a negative penalty for all consensus rounds that follow from the epoch the validator is exited. We could achieve this by continuing to score for 0% participation for all epochs between the exit and withdrawals being enabled.
We have not yet baked this in the v0 model, but are open to adjusting based on community feedback.
We would love the community’s input on whether something along the lines of the ad hoc slashing penalty and/or the proposed penalties to reflect the opportunity cost of slashing should be applied.
Join the discussion here‚Äč
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Ad hoc penalty
Opportunity cost penalties